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U.S.-RUSSIAN NAVAL SECURITY UPGRADES
Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead
Morten Bremer Maerli
For a decade, the U.S. Department of Energy has worked cooperatively withRussia to install modern nuclear security systems for weapons-usable mate-
rial. The effort is known as the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
(MPC&A) program; its mission is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism by rapidly improving the secu-
rity of all weapons-usable nuclear material in forms
other than nuclear weapons in Russia, the NIS (newly
independent states), and the Baltics.1 The program
has substantially increased security for large amounts
of vulnerable nuclear material.2 Hardening storage fa-
cilities against outside but also, even especially, inside
threats is a high priority. Site-tailored and integrated
enhancements include such features as entry/exit bar-
riers and control measures (such as traps, gates, locks,
and portal monitors), personnel access controls, in-
trusion detection systems, alarm communications,
video surveillance, response measures, and computer-
ized systems for nuclear material accounting.3
Notwithstanding successes achieved against the
threat of nuclear theft, however, the bulk of the prolif-
eration challenge remains; hundreds of metric tons of
nuclear material lack improved security systems. As of
March 2003, the Department of Energy (DoE) had as-
sisted Russia in protecting about 228 metric tons, or
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38 percent, of its weapons-usable nuclear material.4 The vast majority of the re-
maining material is at sites in the nuclear weapons complex where, due to Rus-
sian national security concerns, access has been limited and DoE has not been
able to initiate work.
The Department of Energy alone now administers in Russia more than a
dozen distinct nonproliferation programs designed to reduce the risk of nuclear
material or expertise falling into the hands of terrorist organizations and “states
of concern.”5 But there has been an unfortunate tendency to view the various
nonproliferation programs one by one rather than all together. According to
Leonard S. Spector, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Arms Con-
trol and Nonproliferation, there is a need for an approach that recognizes and
addresses cross-program synergy, impacts, and investment opportunities.6 In-
deed, in March 2003 the U.S. General Accounting Office recommended that the
DoE reevaluate its plans for securing Russia’s nuclear material and, with DoD,
develop an integrated plan to ensure coordination of efforts to secure Russia’s
nuclear warheads.7
This article examines the sources of the extraordinary progress of the naval
security upgrades for the fresh, unirradiated naval fuel and nuclear weapons,
and attempts to balance justified security concerns with the need for openness.
The progress made suggests that valuable lessons can be learned from the
U.S.-Russian naval security upgrade program, lessons that could improve on the
mere formalization of access substitutes and contribute to other security up-
grades as well, possibly even to other nuclear nonproliferation activities.
Inherent and legitimate security concerns, however, effectively limit the in-
formation that can be made public from the naval MPC&A program. In fact, the
progress to date could not have been made had not the American and Russian
sides found an effective way to share and at the same time protect sensitive
information.
The assessment is based on interactions with key personnel and on the (lim-
ited) open-source information available on naval MPC&A upgrades. The article
starts with a brief overview and a summary of the historical background and
current status; it then proceeds to an evaluation of the pros and cons of the naval
MPC&A approach. The final section describes future challenges and steps, and
presents recommendations for applying elsewhere the experience of naval Mate-
rial Protection, Control, and Accounting.
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES
From the very beginning, access to Russian nuclear sites has been a significant
stumbling block for U.S.-Russian cooperation on fissile-material security and
nuclear weapons. There has been a lack of clarity on both sides as to kinds of
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access needed, when, for whom, and most importantly, for what purposes.8 As a
result, for instance, all new security contracting at the most sensitive nuclear-
weapons complexes has been suspended since the fall of 1999, pending decisions
and agreements on access.
The Russians have been reluctant to grant the U.S. access to buildings in the
nuclear weapon complexes because of national security concerns and domestic
laws and regulations. The idea of “substitute” arrangements, or “assurances”—
whereby, for instance, photos and video would supplement or substitute for
physical access to sensitive facilities—is under investigation and has been ap-
plied at some Russian sites.9 High-level talks and working groups between DoE
and the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MinAtom) have been initiated to
negotiate overarching and acceptable agreements for the provision of necessary
assurances. Such solutions are intended to be a pragmatic way of avoiding the
most profound sensitivity issues, but they may not address fully the underlying
problems of distrust.
As of January 2003, U.S. teams had obtained or anticipated obtaining access
to thirty-five of the estimated 133 buildings with nuclear material in Russia’s nu-
clear weapons complex. At the remaining buildings (74 percent of the total),
DoE had no access to design or confirm the installation of security systems.10 The
level of access has thus changed very little since February 2001 (see table 1). In
reality, therefore, progress has been limited for much of the most proliferation-
attractive material in the nuclear weapons complex. In contrast, the American
team working on security upgrades for the Russian navy reports access to all sen-
sitive facilities having fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel (see table 1).
DoE has made significant progress protecting buildings at civilian and naval fuel
storage sites and is nearing completion of its security upgrades at these sites. As
of January 2003, DoE had completed work at 78 percent (eighty-five of 110) of
the buildings at these locations.11
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TABLE 1
ACCESS TO FISSILE MATERIAL SITES
Percentage, as of January 2001
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material
Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: February 2001), p. 8.
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The naval MPC&A team has clearly been better able to overcome distrust and
deal with sensitivity issues. It has been given access despite the secrecy and classi-
fication of the design and composition of Russian naval reactor fuel. DoE has
forged productive working relationships with officials of the Russian navy, over-
come security concerns, and negotiated access appropriate to verify installed
physical protection and accounting systems.12 On the basis of this trust, in 1999
the teams moved from protecting fissile material to naval nuclear weapons. By
January 2001, security upgrades were initiated at forty-one of forty-two naval
weapon sites.13 As of March 2003, DoE reported that security had been im-
proved at thirty-three of thirty-six naval weapon sites, the needed access having
been provided.14 The United States expects to finish security upgrades for four
thousand Russian naval nuclear warheads by 2005.15 DoE has, however, scaled
back its plans to assist operational naval sites that support deployed nuclear
weapons, to comply with January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines that preclude
assistance to most operational sites.16
HISTORY AND STATUS OF NAVAL MPC&A
Russia may hold as much as eighty to eighty-five metric tons of HEU for subma-
rine fuel.17 The fuel’s enrichment levels make it a proliferation risk, and econom-
ical and political turmoil has put fissile material management in the former
Soviet Union under unprecedented stress. In the post-Soviet period, the Russian
navy has had severe problems providing satisfactory storage and protection for
its fresh reactor fuel.18 Originally, decaying fences and simple padlocks often
provided the only security.19
After less than a half-decade of work, however, the DoE MPC&A program for
fresh Russian naval fuel storage facilities has made good progress in reducing the
vulnerability of large amounts of HEU—all at highly sensitive installations—to
theft or diversion.20 According to DoE, all the fresh fuel of the Northern Fleet
and at the Pacific Fleet has now been consolidated at two modern storage bunk-
ers, expanded and secured with U.S. assistance.21 In addition, the United States
has assisted in physical protection upgrades for storage ships and auxiliary ships
involved in refueling operations.22 The first fresh fuel–storage security enhance-
ment, at the SevMash submarine production plant in Severodvinsk, was com-
pleted in the fall of 2001. In early 2001, a second facility at the plant was added to
the list to receive security upgrades.23 By June 2003, these security upgrades were
in their final stages.
The HEU naval fuel reduction line at the Machine Building Plant at
Elektrostal, outside Moscow, remains outside the U.S.-Russian cooperative
MPC&A scope, though some work has been done on the facility’s low-enriched
uranium line. From Elektrostal, the fuel is transported by rail to naval storage
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facilities, where it is stored until needed. The fuel is shipped by truck to refueling
locations. Fuel consolidation made transportation security a more pressing is-
sue; security enhancements for truck shipments of fresh naval fuel, including ar-
mored trucks, have been completed.24 Security for rail shipments, on the other
hand, is being considered as part of a separate transportation security project
with MinAtom.25
The foundations for Russian naval MPC&A were laid in March 1995 when
the then commander in chief of the navy, Admiral Gromov, requested assistance
and cooperation between the Navy, the Moscow-based Kurchatov Institute, and
possibly the United States on upgrades for naval fuel storage and handling.26
(The Kurchatov Institute, which provides a wide range of services for the Rus-
sian navy, had by then become a key player in U.S.-Russian security cooperation; 27
the institute operates independently from MinAtom and is free to initiate coop-
eration and sign contracts and agreements with external parties.) The month
before, Admiral Gromov had participated in a MPC&A demonstration and
technical discussions at the institute. U.S. cooperation through the separate
Russian-American Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC&A Program was explored
over the ensuing months. (It produced the first security upgrades at the institute
itself, to Building 116, late in 1994.)28
Since July 1993, attempts to steal nuclear fuel had occurred in the Northern
Fleet (as of early 1996, five known attempts. Since then, no new thefts have been
reported; see table 2). All of these thefts involved “insiders” with direct or indi-
rect access to and knowledge about the material. Cooperation with the DoE
through the Kurchatov Institute was a way for the Russian navy to deal with the
problem. In September 1995, the first MPC&A discussions between U.S. techni-
cal experts and the Russian navy were held at the institute. By the end of the year,
all necessary approvals had been obtained to allow the collaboration to go for-
ward.29 In 1996, this cooperation advanced beyond the talking stage and began
to achieve concrete results.30
In February 1996 a course in U.S. approaches to vulnerability assessment was
conducted through the Kurchatov Institute; it included a demonstration of “As-
sess” software for the Russian navy. The next month, representatives from the
Russian navy visited the United States. In May the same year, representatives
from the DoE and U.S. national laboratories, the Kurchatov Institute, and the
Russian navy met in Moscow. A protocol establishing the scope and approach of
MPC&A work was signed. The American program leader and the Russians
agreed that there should be one small, coherent, and experienced U.S. team to
handle all projects. The U.S. side therefore put together a four-person team, with
highly qualified personnel from four different national laboratories, to work di-
rectly with the Russian navy.
M A E R L I 2 3
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The U.S. side saw and managed the entire “naval sector” as one integrated
program. There was a need to move fast and efficiently, as the Russian navy was
watching developments closely. Following a visit by Admiral Gromov to the
United States in April 1995, American experts had been invited to Site 49, the
main storage site for fresh fuel near Murmansk since May 1994.31 In cooperation
with the Kurchatov Institute, the new expert team designed a set of security up-
grades for the facility, provided necessary new technologies, and funded con-
struction. In parallel, the U.S. team was working at Murmansk Shipping
Company (MSCo) to secure the fresh fuel of the nuclear-propelled icebreaker
fleet. Necessary upgrades focused on the auxiliary ship Imandra—moored at the
Atomflot harbor, north of Murmansk—which carried fresh nuclear fuel; on
port perimeter security enhancement; and on access control. The work at MSCo
began with a site visit in June 1996, followed in September by the first-ever
U.S.-Russian vulnerability assessment. By the end of 1996 the U.S. and Russian
teams had a conceptual design ready.
In July 1996, the Russian navy, the Kurchatov Institute, and DoE issued a joint
statement that they would “cooperate to ensure the highest possible standards of
control, accounting and physical protection for all storage locations of the Navy
of the Russian Federation, containing fresh highly enriched uranium fuels for
naval nuclear reactors.”32 The statement solidified cooperation and a protocol
achieved in a meeting in Moscow in May the same year.
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THEFTS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, NORTHERN REGION
Source: Rensselaer W. Lee III, ”Recent Trends in Nuclear Smuggling,“ in Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat? ed. Phillip G. Williams (London: Frank Cass,
1996), pp. 118–19, with minor additions.
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A comprehensive agreement with the Russian navy for MPC&A at all naval
sites was formalized in a high-level protocol signed in December 1997 by a new
commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, and the
secretary of energy, Federico Pena. On this occasion the Russians again stressed
the importance of maintaining a cohesive and highly qualified team, leaving the
U.S. side with little choice but to keep the original personnel. The Russian navy
deemed the threats to the Northern Fleet the most severe.33 When, two years
later, DoE established a similar, but more limited, set of projects for the Pacific
Fleet, it was with the same team.
In January 1999 the scope of nuclear material protection, control, and ac-
counting cooperation with the Russian navy was expanded.34 New initiatives in-
cluded further upgrading of nuclear fuel storage facilities, a feasibility study for
dismantling aging submarines, and the securing of naval spent fuel that repre-
sented a proliferation threat. The program was broadened to include a naval
training facility in Obninsk. More importantly, the security upgrades discussed
above were to be extended to the Russian navy’s nuclear weapon installations as
well as fuel sites.35
On 31 August 2000 an “umbrella” agreement was signed between the U.S. De-
partment of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Defense solidifying this realm
of cooperation and outlining expanded future joint work in nuclear material se-
curity. By this agreement the Russian navy formally became the Russian execu-
tive agent for implementing the cooperative program.36
Other U.S. agencies are far from reaching the level of collaboration with the
Russian Ministry of Defense that DoE has achieved. The Russian Ministry of
Defense has not provided the U.S. Department of Defense with any access to nu-
clear weapon installations.37 However, 34 percent of the fencing paid by the
United States has been installed to address external threats at fifty-two Russian
nuclear weapon sites. In sum, the progress of the Defense Department’s
“Weapons PC&A program,” with the Twelfth Main Directorate of the Russian
Ministry of Defense, has been limited.38 For the most part, the Defense Depart-
ment has hardly been able to move beyond testing the MPC&A equipment to be
installed.39 The high-level agreement between the DoE and the Russian defense
ministry was thus a very important breakthrough.
An overview of completed and ongoing DoE naval facility security upgrades
as of June 2003 is given in tables 3A and 3B.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESS IN NAVAL MPC&A
The examination that follows of the reasons for the progress made in U.S.-
Russian naval security upgrades is based primarily on interviews with key
American personnel. There are essentially five reasons, all of which are likely to
M A E R L I 2 5
7
Maerli: U.S.-Russian Naval Security Upgrades—Lessons Learned and the Way
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
play important roles in the final outcome of the program:40 strategic goals and
approaches; organizational structure and work methods; compliance with do-
mestic laws and with licensing and certification requirements; high-level in-
volvement and support; and finally, sustainability.
Strategic Goals and Approaches
For the fresh-fuel security upgrades, the Russian and American sides shared in-
terests and purposes from the beginning. Several thefts of naval HEU fuel
prompted the Russian navy to make contact with the United States, and the
Americans were eager to limit the diversion of the proliferation-attractive mate-
rial. The efficiency achieved in implementation was a direct consequence of the
work done for the Murmansk Shipping Company at Atomflot and on board the
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U.S.-SUPPORTED NAVAL MPC&A UPGRADES
a. Capacity expansion, physical upgrades, computerized control and accounting. Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Ken N. Luongo, Renewing the Partner-
ship: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Russian American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council, August 2000), p. 60; and David Lambert et al., “Upgrades to the Russian Navy’s Consolidated Storage Locations and Fuel
Transfer Ships,” Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management (n.p.: 1998).
b. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001), p. 34.
c. New building has same upgrades as Site 49, with hardened entrance portal.
d. DOE Press Release, “Secretary Richardson Hails Completed Security Upgrades at Ceremony in Russian Far East,” US R-00-226, 1 September 2000, available
at U.S. Department of Energy, energy.gov/HQPress/releases00/seppr/pr00226.htm.
e. Detection, communications, intruder delay, response, control, and accountability.
f. GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 8, n. 6.
g. Large capacity for fresh and spent fuel, liquid radioactive waste.
h. John Brook Wolfsthal, Cristina-Astrid Chuen, and Emily E. Daughty, eds. Nuclear Status Report 6 (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Af-
fairs; and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001), p. 134.
i. Carries submarine fuel from Chzhma ship repair facility to Gornyak shipyard. Ibid., p. 146.
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Imandra. The Russian navy appreciated the demonstrated U.S. interest and
commitment, and as a result, for the first time the Department of Energy had an
opportunity to work directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
At the outset of the cooperation with the Russian navy, a step-by-step ap-
proach was chosen, in which the Russians decided upon each next step. Every
project thus depended on the success of the previous one, and progress was
closely watched. As one of the American project members stated, “There was
zero tolerance for failure.” Later, urgent improvements (generally finished
within six months) were pursued in parallel with preliminary design work on
comprehensive security upgrades at the same locations. The comprehensive
projects would be negotiated and then implemented according to the agreed
plans.41 As the upgrades proceeded, it became more and more apparent to each
party that its counterpart was committed to make the program work.
Organizational Structure and Work Methods
The initial organization chosen for the naval upgrades was “flat,” a pragmatic,
highly efficient structure. Communication was free among all parties involved.
U.S. team members could personally contact high-level Russian navy counter-
parts. This drastically increased interaction and allowed for quick problem solv-
ing when needed.
The naval MPC&A program was thus a true child of the teamwork spirit of
the early days of U.S.-Russian cooperation.42 The new MPC&A approach in-
cluded willingness to use Russian equipment and contractors.43 The program
also offered a more flexible approach to verification. Instead of a strict on-site
inspection regime, a more cooperative and less adversarial approach was cho-
sen. American and Russian MPC&A experts would sit down together and jointly
assess the situation before and after the security upgrades. What the U.S. team
might lose in terms of insight through formal inspections it was likely to gain
through a voluntary and informal flow of information.
Cooperation between DoE and the Russian navy is governed by confidential-
ity agreements. Information shared within the joint working group that has not
previously been published in the public domain can be released only by consent
of all parties involved. This effectively precluded external assessment or supervi-
sion, but it probably helped increase significantly the information flow within
the group.
The naval MPC&A upgrades are supported by formal documents on all levels
and at all stages of the work. Everything from working plans to protocols and
agreements had (and has) to be approved by all parties. This arrangement allows
formalized delegation of responsibilities and a transparent working environ-
ment. Some overarching agreements have, however, been put in place after the
M A E R L I 2 7
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projects were well advanced, either to boost or expand ongoing activities or for
corrective reasons.44
The Russian side identifies facilities in need of upgrading. In the design of op-
timal security solutions, however, the two sides work together. A joint vulnera-
bility assessment is performed with the Assess computer model, after discussions
on the input data. Design consensus is not only sought but essential before imple-
mentation of individual upgrades. For example, one facility lacked a sufficient
guard force. No money was released nor further work authorized before the Rus-
sians increased the guards there. (It was this experience, moreover, that made the
Russians realize the need to consolidate the fuel at fewer sites, as no upgrades
would be made at other facilities without similar guard force improvements.)
The Kurchatov Institute serves as a general contractor and an agent for the
Russian navy, as the navy itself is not allowed to sign contracts with U.S. labora-
tories. In addition, the institute often executes work tasks. Vulnerability














































































U.S.-SUPPORTED NAVAL MPC&A UPGRADES (cont’d)
a. Upgrades for detection, intruder delay, response, and material accounting.
b. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001), p. 34.
c. Upgrades completed on three (Sovjetsky Soyuz, Vaigach, Yamal) out of eight ships as of summer 2003.
d. U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001).
e. Northwestern Russia and Far East, locations unknown. All are inside operational naval bases. Total 260 metric tons of nuclear material, number of war-
heads unknown.
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assessment and preliminary designs are typically assigned to Kurchatov, as is the
establishment of training programs. The institute can subcontract negotiated
tasks; it is the parent company of Atomservice (AS), which performs all types of
civil engineering and construction work. Other security subcontractors are
Eleron and Escort Center; the American team can go directly to these firms if the
Kurchatov Institute is not involved.
The United States pays only for work completed, and not for overhead costs
to the Russian participants. Completed security upgrades are certified in writing
by the Russian navy and are generally inspected by American representatives. All
work performed must be documented and results demonstrated prior to pay-
ment. Every contract is negotiated separately. U.S. laboratories now sign con-
tracts directly with their Russian counterparts, after approval by Department of
Energy headquarters. However, attempts have been made to centralize these
contracts on the U.S. side, as part of an attempt to track negotiations more
closely and to streamline and expedite contacts.
Compliance with Domestic Laws and Regulations
Security systems are designed in accordance with vulnerability assessments and
technical specifications jointly agreed upon. Russian contractors then build the
systems to the agreed design. The systems typically consist of a wide range of
components, including foreign equipment bought in Russia. However, as long as
these components are precertified by relevant Russian authorities, final designs
and systems are regarded as Russian. This eases often-complex issues related to
certification, taxation, and maintenance.
In parallel with the upgrades, a documentation project has been initiated to
assess the current MPC&A regulatory status of the Russian naval nuclear mate-
rials and to determine what the governing regulations and guidelines are.45
While the United States recognizes the relevance of Russian laws and regula-
tions, it is not likely to pay for measures not indicated by vulnerability assess-
ments even if they are required by Russian law. The Russians are, however, free to
include such features themselves. One example is radiation monitors; Russian
law calls for them, but because they do not directly improve security, they are not
normally installed at U.S. expense.
High-Level Involvement and Support
The Russian navy’s Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security
plays an essential role in this collaboration. The inspectorate is led by Admiral
Nikolai Yurasov. The admiral is well regarded within the Navy, and his interest in
and promotion of these security upgrades have been instrumental in the success
and progress of the program. Russian high-level support extends to the head of
the Northern Fleet, a fact that has eased interactions with headquarters-level
M A E R L I 2 9
11
Maerli: U.S.-Russian Naval Security Upgrades—Lessons Learned and the Way
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
bureaucrats and military opponents of this collaboration. It has, moreover, cre-
ated an important vehicle for communication with other Russian agencies, like
the forces of the Ministry of Interior, which protects facilities of the Russian
Economic Ministry, and the Federal Security Service (FSB).46
The fact that the Navy quite early acknowledged an internal security problem
and declared a genuine interest in fixing it has been important for the support it
has received. MinAtom, in contrast, has tended to put less emphasis on the in-
side threat and to regard MPC&A deficiencies as primarily an economic prob-
lem. International expertise and cooperation thus easily become secondary in
MinAtom’s eyes to obtaining domestic funding for upgrades. Cultural and orga-
nizational differences in the two organizations are also likely to have played a
role. A naval chain of command seems to have eased communication of and re-
inforced directives from Moscow to the facilities where installations were to take
place, limiting the effect of any local intransigence.
On the American side, however, if the naval MPC&A program had top-level
support in DoE, it may have lacked high-level interest. In the beginning, the
small program was not perceived as very important and was more or less “left
alone.” This may have actually, if paradoxically, helped in the initial stages of the
program, as it gave the U.S. side discretion to build the strong foundation its
Russian counterpart was looking for. The American team was not afflicted by
personnel replacements, and all participants soon knew each other. Internal
rules establishing a well defined process, mode of cooperation, and working
structure were quickly put in place. That experience of building up working
groups contrasts, to some degree, with DoE collaborations with MinAtom.
There, in an attempt to manage the program and prevent personnel “burnout,”
the U.S. side has changed personnel and administrative procedures quite fre-
quently, probably to the detriment of the long-term effort.
The role of the U.S. Navy in the early stages of the naval MPC&A cooperation
has been given little or no attention. The initial hope was to get the U.S. Navy “on
board” and initiate reciprocal visits and activities for Russian counterparts to
American naval bases. This, however, has been unacceptable to the U.S. Navy, so
much so that the American MPC&A community is concerned that the whole
collaboration would fail if the Russians asked for such visits. (They have never
demanded or requested any such reciprocity.) Further, to limit the risk to sensi-
tive nuclear information, the U.S. Navy has insisted that only personnel unfa-
miliar with its activities be involved in cooperation with the Russian navy. (The
American team members, handpicked from national laboratories, had indeed
little knowledge of U.S. naval secrets.) These initial objections having been met,
the U.S. Navy backed the program. Its endorsement was of great importance in
3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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terms of domestic political and bureaucratic support for the program. Through-
out the project, the U.S. Navy has been regularly updated as to progress.
Until recently, and while DoE has always dealt with overall policy issues and
provided oversight, the American team has continued to enjoy a fairly free and
open environment with respect to discussions with Russian counterparts on
technical issues. However, as the naval MPC&A program has grown and matured,
so also has high-level interest on both sides, and with it requirements for over-
sight and control. The recent expansion of MPC&A upgrades to naval nuclear-
weapons installations has also produced closer follow-up and tighter reins.
Further, on the American side, increasing interagency and congressional interest
has required closer project management and an increase in staff at the federal
level. The result has been more complicated and lengthy procedural approaches,
and in turn slower processes and prolonged negotiations, all of which create
frustration at the working level. It has, moreover, limited the interaction and
communication among technical project participants on both sides, reducing
the possibility of quick problem solving when needed.
Sustainability
The training of Russian naval personnel is an integral part of the MPC&A pro-
gram, vital to its long-term operation. A goal of the training program is to instill
in managers a culture of sustainable commitment to MPC&A activities.47 A se-
ries of two courses has been developed and presented at the Kurchatov Institute.
An MPC&A fundamentals class consists of class lectures and practical training
at various facilities. The objective of the second training course is to prepare na-
val personnel to work independently in their particular areas at naval facilities.
In addition, to validate the long-term performance of the installed systems, a
program has been initiated to deal with their life-cycle management. The
Kurchatov Institute has been given this task under a separate contract. The pro-
gram provides a structured way of ensuring the performance and integrity of all
components (including the guard force) of an upgraded system, through regular
(annual) testing, and the program has been the preferred approach of the Rus-
sian Ministry of Transportation. The program reveals whether everything is in
place and identifies special needs, like additional training, maintenance, or spare
parts, as well as problems with software, hardware, or procedures. Life-cycle
management is a quantifiable way of addressing long-term risk reduction and
sustainability of measures put in place. Moreover, structured follow-up rein-
forces the sincerity and commitment to the joint cooperation of all involved.
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FUTURE CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD
The naval MPC&A program now having been successfully implemented, and in
view of the remaining challenges in fissile material security, the theme for the fu-
ture must be expansion. Specifically, the scope of the naval MPC&A cooperation
could be extended, and the naval approach could be extended to U.S.-Russian
MPC&A cooperation as a whole.
Expanding the Scope of Naval MPC&A Cooperation
Notwithstanding the accomplishments of naval MPC&A, there is unfinished
business, as well as room for further improvement in the cooperation with the
Russian navy. As Russian naval facilities are not subject to any form of indepen-
dent supervision or licensing, the long-term quality and sustainability of the
measures now in place are hard to evaluate and protect. Thus, an independent
review of the overall integrity of the integrated systems put in place would be
highly desirable.
The life-cycle management program now introduced is a step in the right di-
rection, but there is a risk that the highly pragmatic U.S. approach taken has ne-
glected Russian laws and regulations—and in a way that may undermine the
long-term security goals of all parties. Certainly, due to budgetary constraints
and the necessity for speed, none of the security systems installed are likely to
meet domestic American standards. The installed accounting systems for fresh
fuel were developed without access to classified Russian fuel information, mak-
ing their value somewhat uncertain.48 Moreover, the guard force is an integral
component in the MPC&A system, yet its mode of employment is novel for Rus-
sian security forces and still poorly understood.
Further, spent naval fuel may contain both plutonium and highly enriched
uranium, and therefore may constitute a proliferation risk; in particular, naval
fuel with low burn-up and extended cooling periods is potentially attractive to
would-be proliferators, both states and subnational groups.49 Currently, the U.S.
MPC&A mandate excludes all of this material. Irradiated Russian naval nuclear
fuel in fact remains highly enriched;50 taking into account its cooling time, it
does indeed pose a threat from a proliferation standpoint.51 This threat will only
increase with time.
Moreover, while the Russian navy has declared that all its fresh fuel in the
northern region has been consolidated into one building, Site 49, where it is pro-
tected, there has been no independent verification. As recently as 1996 the num-
ber of storage facilities to be covered was not known; anecdotal reports indicate
that fresh fuel dumps had been established on the Kola Peninsula as backups for
crises.52 Thus, there is a risk that the Russian navy has not included all depots
needing upgrading—and Site 49, though newly expanded, is reportedly already
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full. No U.S. teams have visited even the known old facilities to verify that noth-
ing was left behind in consolidation. Again, therefore, an independent review
analysis would be highly desirable, to increase confidence in system perfor-
mance and coverage. Such an overall, independent assessment should also be of
interest to the Russian navy, as it would boost security and possibly strengthen
the prospects of expanded American funding.
The inclusion of nuclear weapon sites in the naval MPC&A program is an im-
portant and particularly gratifying development. Russia has indicated that it
would like improved security systems installed at additional weapons locations.
However, as of March 2003, Russia has provided only limited information about
new nuclear weapon locations and security conditions.53 The needed informa-
tion ought to be presented as soon as possible, again to secure future funds and
allow prudent long-term planning.
Finally, the naval program’s establishment of close working relations and
consolidation of fuel at centralized storage facilities has created a sound basis for
an overall Russian HEU accounting exercise. The naval MPC&A may therefore
act as a springboard to increased transparency and possibly future nonintrusive
verification measures for highly sensitive fuel cycles—that is, material with clas-
sified parameters, like the fuel used for naval propulsion or excess fissile material
from dismantled nuclear weapons.54
Extending the Naval Approach
Russia and the United States have come a long way in their nuclear security co-
operation. Yet, as mentioned, the majority, and probably the most challenging,
of the needed MPC&A upgrades in the Russian Federation lie in other coopera-
tive programs for protection of weapon-usable material. Several calls have thus
been made for the need to revitalize U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation.55
In this regard, there is a particular need for a comprehensive review of coopera-
tive security programs to assess strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures.
The focus should be on identifying lessons and determining how to use them to
solve current and future problems.56
The pragmatic, coherent, and flexible stepwise approach of the initial naval
MPC&A upgrades has pointed to a highly efficient way of solving access prob-
lems and achieving results at sensitive facilities. Naval MPC&A would be a useful
“case study,” a source of working methods that might be fruitful at other sensi-
tive facilities in the Russian nuclear-weapon complex. Currently, however, such
unusual program approaches are not held up to broad scrutiny, except on a
piecemeal or even accidental basis, since there is no regular discussion of policy
implementation standards.57
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Ideally, the naval MPC&A experiences could be shared in the forum of a joint,
overarching U.S.-Russian technical committee overseeing the MPC&A pro-
gram, and then distributed to other MPC&A personnel through seminars or
guidelines on achieving program objectives. Policy makers and bureaucrats
could be invited to workshops and briefed on different MPC&A working ap-
proaches. This not only would help them identify best practices and pertinent
differences in national safety and security cultures but could create a foundation
for extended and coordinated threat-reduction support from a wider range of
contributors, such as Western Europeans, who have a self-interest in seeing all
MPC&A programs sustained and strengthened. Naval MPC&A experience
could, moreover, be fed into ongoing access discussions and negotiations be-
tween the Russian and American parties, to help them better determine what
kinds of access are needed, to what, and to what ends.
In the early stages of the U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation, a joint steering
group dealt with overall planning and discussions, and developed a joint plan
(including a section on the flexible-assurances approach). This coordinating
group was eliminated in the fall of 1995, after internal disagreements on the Rus-
sian side about who should be in charge of the group. One option would be to
revive this group, making sure that its composition met the criteria of all parties.
A twofold approach could be considered. A U.S.-Russian MPC&A steering
group could deal with the policy aspects and coordination of MPC&A activities.
An equivalent joint technical coordinating group could, on the basis of the naval
approach, identify and refine technical approaches that have been valuable.
Sustainability is typically seen as a “Russian” issue, one of merely overcoming
deterioration due to organizational, structural, technological, and cultural fac-
tors.58 However, there seems to be a need to address the sustainability of sound
MPC&A policy and practice as well. It may be hard to rebuild the collaboration
if it is somehow destroyed; the benefits of maintaining the novel U.S.-Russian
working relationships achieved seem obvious. In recent years, bureaucratic fac-
tors have hampered the effective implementation of U.S. nonproliferation poli-
cies in Russia.59
With the expansion of security upgrades to the area of naval nuclear weap-
ons, and with increased U.S. and Russian federal interest in the project, further
changes of the “rules of the game” may be deemed necessary to allow high-level
authorities on both sides to follow the developments more closely. If so, much care
should be given to avoiding new procedural difficulties. The future of U.S.-Russian
naval security upgrades, and the MPC&A program in general, may strongly depend
on how well trade-offs are chosen between progress and strict oversight.
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The results of the naval upgrades confirm that U.S. and Russian experts
working together in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect can significantly
reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation by improving systems of nuclear mate-
rial protection, control, and accounting.60 As evidenced by the naval MPC&A
program, a flexible and nonadversarial cooperative approach is likely to avoid
many of the problems other parts of the MPC&A program are facing and thus to
achieve the shared long-term goals of sustained nuclear security.
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